Has Pakistan had an Iran-China Epiphany?
Pakistan may be coming to terms with the reality that its longstanding assumptions about the region—its relationship with China, the persistent tensions with Iran, and the impacts of Iranian aggression on China-led integration—are no longer tenable. As these pressures converge, the signs suggest that Islamabad could finally be rethinking its approach. Is Pakistan now ready to recalibrate its strategy to align with these evolving regional dynamics?
This article explores recent developments and other factors that suggest Pakistan is beginning to recognise the need for a strategic recalibration.
Another Attack on Chinese Nationals in Pakistan
Yet again, Chinese nationals have come under attack in Pakistan. This time, it was in Karachi’s industrial hub, where a security guard opened fire on two Chinese engineers, critically injuring one. It follows last month’s suicide bombing near Karachi airport that killed two Chinese workers. These repeated breaches highlight Pakistan’s ongoing struggle to protect Chinese personnel within its borders. At the time of writing, we are unaware if the attacker was linked to a terrorist group. We are also unaware of China’s thoughts, but Pakistan, once again, “reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the safety and security of Chinese nationals, projects, and institutions in Pakistan.”
These incidents have set off discussions in Beijing about whether China should directly intervene to safeguard its citizens and investments in Pakistan, particularly those tied to Belt and Road projects. While Chinese officials are calling for stricter security, Islamabad remains wary of allowing foreign forces to operate on Pakistani soil—a stance China should share. Establishing a formal security footprint in Pakistan would complicate China’s position not only with Pakistan but also within the broader region, and it could invite greater terrorism, facilitated by third parties, to target both Chinese nationals and Pakistan as a whole.
A Rising Security Crisis That’s Garnering International Attention
This latest violence is part of a disturbing surge in targeted attacks on Chinese nationals, largely by Baloch separatists and, to a lesser extent, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The threat has grown so pronounced that the Lowy Institute published a piece in April titled “Pakistan: The Dangerous Reality of Working on China’s Megaprojects,” underscoring the relentless wave of insurgent violence that leaves Chinese nationals exposed. Those working on projects linked to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), especially in Pakistan’s northwest and southwest regions, are especially at risk. These attacks send a clear message to Beijing about Pakistan’s ongoing difficulties in securing foreign investments and personnel amidst its own security issues.
Balochistan: China’s Primary Security Concern in Pakistan
Beijing’s main security concerns in Pakistan centre around Balochistan, where separatist groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) have consistently targeted Chinese nationals involved in CPEC projects. While the TTP remains a threat, China’s focus is more on the insurgency in Balochistan. For Pakistan, however, this issue stretches beyond just Chinese interests. These attacks not only deter foreign investment but fuel wider instability, creating space for other militant groups and outside actors to exploit Pakistan’s internal security gaps.
The last major attack—a BLA suicide bombing on 6 October 2024—targeted a convoy of Chinese engineers near Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport, killing two Chinese nationals and injuring at least ten others. This incident further exposed significant cracks in Pakistan’s security framework, especially when protecting foreign nationals involved in strategic infrastructure projects. In response, Pakistani authorities rushed to reassure China with promises of enhanced security measures. Still, Beijing’s firm reaction revealed a growing impatience over Pakistan’s inability to safeguard its citizens and investments.
The Domestic Lens Versus Broader Geopolitical Pressures
Inside Pakistan, security circles often frame these incidents within a domestic context, while also frequently pointing fingers at India. The prevailing narrative highlights unrest in regions like Balochistan as the main factor behind these attacks, arguing that Pakistan lacks full control or enforcement in these areas.
But this view misses the bigger picture: the issue isn’t solely domestic. It mirrors long-standing geopolitical tensions, not just Pakistan’s relationship with India. The hesitation to acknowledge these wider dynamics stems from political caution and a reluctance to confront the broader strategic realities. This unwillingness mutes crucial discussions, leaving Pakistan’s approach reactive rather than proactive, and allowing these underlying pressures to continue escalating unchecked.
Explosions in Panjgur: Iran, Pakistan, or Joint Strikes?
On 5th November 2024, explosions reverberated through Pakistan’s Panjgur district in Balochistan, swiftly igniting a swirl of claims and counterclaims around what exactly unfolded. Speculation from some sources in Pakistan suggested a joint Iran-Pakistan operation targeting smuggling or militant networks, though official channels in Islamabad have yet to corroborate any such collaboration.
Diplomatic Promises vs. On-the-Ground Realities
These explosions occurred just as renewed diplomatic efforts between Iran and Pakistan to coordinate on counter-terrorism were underway, with Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi and Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar making statements in Islamabad on the same day the strikes took place. Yet, with no concrete confirmation of a joint operation, practical cooperation may not align seamlessly with these public pledges. Some Iranian-linked sources reported airstrikes involving drones or jets, though specifics remain elusive.
Strategic Signals from Pakistan’s Side
In my article, Iranian Aggression and the Spectrum of International Responses, I covered a similar incident in this region, where Pakistani forces swiftly responded to border escalations. Given its significant military capabilities, Pakistan may now consider recalibrating its stance, driven by the pressing need to counter any cross-border activity more assertively. The stakes have only risen with significant Chinese investments in Balochistan, adding a layer of urgency to Pakistan’s response framework. This evolving situation signals that Pakistan may be ready to respond more forcefully if future incidents threaten its security. In the current landscape, Pakistan seems increasingly determined to secure its borders and navigate the complex pressures from both regional dynamics and shifting alliances.
Chinese-led Regional Integration
China’s relationships with Afghanistan and Iran, along with how Iran and Afghanistan interact, highlight layers of strategic interests and economic links and deepen regional issues along Pakistan’s borders and the immediate region. China engages with Afghanistan to expand trade and infrastructure, using its Belt and Road Initiative to boost connectivity while keeping a close watch on extremism that could spill over into Xinjiang. Its ties with Iran have grown through a 25-year cooperation deal and steady oil trade despite sanctions, reflecting their mutual aim to bypass Western pressure and collaborate on energy and infrastructure. Military drills and strategic discussions within groups like BRICS add further weight to their partnership.
Meanwhile, the relationship between Iran and Afghanistan is a mix of cooperation and tension. They work on trade and infrastructure projects, such as railways and port developments, driven by shared economic needs. However, disputes over water rights, particularly involving the Helmand River, and escalating border security clashes have stirred friction. Even with diplomatic efforts and humanitarian moves, their relationship is an uneasy balance of collaboration and conflict.
For more information: Iran & The Taliban: Islamist Regimes Battle Over Water Resources
Pakistan is Sidelined From Chinese-led Regional Integration
Pakistan finds itself increasingly sidelined in China-led regional integration, while Iran secures strategic advantages despite its alleged support for groups like the BLA, which carry out attacks targeting Chinese nationals and investments within Pakistan. China’s recent actions add to this dynamic—not only shifting investments towards Iran but also publicly criticising Pakistan for failing to protect Chinese nationals and CPEC projects. Yet, China has notably avoided acknowledging Iran’s role in supporting terrorism within Pakistan. From Islamabad’s perspective, this sends an unfair message: countries that sponsor terrorism impacting Chinese projects in neighbouring states face no consequences, while those unable to prevent such acts face significant repercussions. In essence, China appears to reward Iran while punishing Pakistan for its struggles to shield Chinese interests from Iranian-sponsored terrorism.
China’s decision to favour Iran, even while Iranian-backed groups allegedly target and kill Chinese nationals in Pakistan, makes it evident that this isn’t truly about protecting its people. If it were, China would be holding Iran accountable as well. By shifting its strategic investment focus to Iran and publicly criticising Pakistan, it’s clear that Beijing’s actions are guided by larger geopolitical ambitions rather than the safety of its citizens. This shift underscores that, for China, securing influential regional alliances takes precedence over genuinely prioritising the welfare of its own people.
In January 2024, tensions between Iran and Pakistan escalated when Iran conducted strikes on Pakistani territory, targeting militant groups but resulting in civilian casualties. China, maintaining close ties with both nations, intervened by urging Pakistan to exercise restraint and offered to mediate the situation. Within Pakistan, pro-Iranian factions advocated for non-retaliation, with some public figures discouraging a military response and others lobbying privately for restraint. Despite this, Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Asim Munir insisted on a retaliatory response, leading to Pakistan conducting strikes inside Iran within 24 hours. Subsequently, Pakistani officials informed China of their willingness to accept its mediation. This sequence of events highlighted Pakistan’s frustration with the perceived double standards, where it faced pressure to show restraint while Iran’s actions were met with leniency.
A telling example of Pakistan’s isolation is the mock-up for the BRICS currency, where Afghanistan’s flag was included while Pakistan’s was left out—even though Afghanistan isn’t even a BRICS member. This move goes beyond just India’s influence over regional optics; it reflects deeper doubts about Pakistan’s position and reliability in regional alliances. The fact that Pakistan is being sidelined in favour of countries like the Taliban’s Afghanistan, which, despite its instability, somehow carries more weight in certain circles, shows just how much the regional landscape is shifting. It’s a clear sign that Pakistan’s role is becoming increasingly marginal as these dynamics evolve.
The sidelining is exacerbated by China’s approach to regional investments, where it increasingly views Iran and Afghanistan as more reliable in securing Chinese interests than Pakistan. This stems from Pakistan’s inability to fully control militancy both within its borders and across them, which damages its reputation as a dependable partner. On the other hand, Iran and Afghanistan, despite their own challenges, maintain tighter, more authoritarian systems that appeal to China’s preference for stability. Again, China appears to reward these nations, even with their alleged support for groups that target Chinese projects in Pakistan. At the same time, Beijing discourages Pakistan from taking actions that could disrupt its growing investment focus in Iran and Afghanistan. This further underscores a changing regional landscape, where Pakistan’s role continues to shrink, leaving it to grapple with the fallout alone.
Recent developments highlight growing engagement between Russia and Pakistan, marked by a series of high-level interactions. Meetings with Pakistan’s top military leadership and joint exercises like the annual Druzhba counter-terrorism drill, which has been ongoing since 2016, show the steady deepening of military ties. Pakistan’s Senate hosting Valentina Matvienko, Speaker of Russia’s Federation Council, signals a push towards more serious parliamentary connections. Add to that the expected visit of Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko to Islamabad, and there’s a clear signal of potential diplomatic strengthening.
While the idea of Pakistan’s engagement with BRICS aligns with these moves, it’s important to see how Russia’s game plan in the region contrasts with Pakistan’s challenges, especially given Russia’s warming relations with the Afghan Taliban while Pakistan deals with violence spilling over from Afghanistan. Russia itself, while cooperative with China, doesn’t really want to be dependent on the Chinese, and some distrust remains. This strategic alliance, which also includes India, should be viewed with extreme scepticism.
Security Strains and Pakistan’s Strategic Challenges
On 6 October 2024, the suicide bombing near Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport killed three people, including two Chinese nationals, and injured 17 others. This followed a similar attack in March, where a suicide bomber targeted Chinese workers at the Dasu Hydropower Project in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These consecutive incidents have intensified scrutiny over Pakistan’s ability to safeguard Chinese nationals involved in CPEC projects.
Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Jiang Zaidong, issued a blunt response: “It is very unacceptable for us to be attacked twice in only six months and these attacks have also caused casualties.” He emphasised that security remains a top priority for China, adding, “Security is the biggest concern for China and a constraint to CPEC in Pakistan. We hope that the Pakistani side could create a conducive and safe environment.”
Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Mumtaz Zahra Baloch, described the ambassador’s comments as “surprising,” stating that they did not align with the usual diplomatic tone between the two countries. She asserted that Pakistan is aware of China’s concerns and has been sharing investigation updates related to the incidents.
Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Jiang Zaidong’s strong statement on security lapses brings to mind past US criticisms when it pressured Pakistan to “do more” against terrorism. While US demands were met with significant backlash and stirred anti-American sentiment, China’s stern call—focused on attacks against Chinese nationals and CPEC security—has not provoked the same response. This difference underscores internal perceptions in Pakistan, where China is regarded as a strategic ally and its criticisms are taken more seriously. At both the state level and among the public, there’s caution when it comes to criticising China openly. The perception that China could impose severe consequences if its interests were jeopardised adds to this cautious approach.
Pakistan’s cautious, more submissive stance toward China mirrors its approach toward Iran and Afghanistan, where criticisms remain muted despite the significant challenges these countries pose through their influence and support for terrorism. In contrast, Pakistan has been much more vocal in its criticisms of the US, showcasing a longstanding mistrust and a willingness to push back openly. This pattern is even more pronounced with India, where tensions and criticism are far more overt, unlike the relative quiet surrounding Iran and Afghanistan, which are seldom or less vociferously mentioned in comparison.
This suggests that Pakistan’s domestic ideological alignments and historical narratives play a bigger role in shaping public and state perceptions than pure national security concerns do. The more submissive response toward China, along with the restrained criticism of Iran and Afghanistan, indicates that Pakistan’s approach is shaped by deeper beliefs about alliances, strategic dependencies, and historical affiliations. This stands in contrast to the more open and critical stance toward the US and India, highlighting how ideological considerations and perceived strategic partnerships influence Pakistan’s responses, beyond just immediate security needs.
Yes, much of this is also tied to Pakistan’s growing strategic reliance on China, including for key military equipment, such as submarines, fighter jets, and broader defence cooperation, reinforcing a measured response to Chinese pressure. However, this reliance on China is partly self-imposed, driven by aforementioned perceptions, ideological leanings, and strategic missteps—such as viewing the Taliban as long-term allies and pushing the US out of Afghanistan by sponsoring and facilitating the Taliban against American interests, rather than viewing the US presence as an opportunity to maintain leverage over an Afghan government more cooperative than today’s aggressive and ideologically influential Taliban. Pakistan could have better used the US presence in Afghanistan to secure other benefits from the US and balance strategic relationships.
Is Pakistan “Doing More” to Protect Chinese Nationals?
Baloch terror groups and nationalists have long regarded Chinese investments in Balochistan, especially those tied to CPEC, as symbols of external exploitation that threaten their sovereignty. These groups argue that such projects marginalise the Baloch people and strengthen the state’s capacity to suppress local dissent under the guise of development. Mahrang Baloch, an emerging voice for Baloch grievances, remarked, “We believe that the responsibility for the current state of the Baloch people and the oppression they face lies not only with the state of Pakistan but also with countries such as China, whose funds are being used by the state to carry out the Baloch genocide.” In reaction to this perceived encroachment, the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) organises demonstrations against what they view as resource exploitation masked as progress. The BYC’s goal is to fuel public resistance and reinforce local opposition to these projects. Meanwhile, Pakistani authorities have renewed calls to ban the BYC, labelling it a threat to state security and stability.
Shortly after the Karachi attack, Mahrang Baloch was prevented from leaving Pakistan, and her mobile phone and passport were reportedly confiscated as she returned from Karachi airport. Some Baloch nationalist sources even claim there was an attempted abduction of her driver. These actions are seen as an attempt to block her from speaking at international forums in ways that could displease the Pakistani state. Reports also emerged of Baloch students being detained by law enforcement at Punjab University, Lahore, following an attack carried out by a Baloch suicide bomber with a master’s degree from a university in Punjab, which killed Chinese nationals in Karachi. An FIR (First Information Report) filed in Karachi accuses Mahrang Baloch of supporting Baloch separatist groups, inciting youth in Balochistan, and using protests as a channel to aid terrorist activities.
In addition, the Pakistani government has authorised the creation of internment centres in Balochistan, a move that came after a series of terrorist attacks on August 26, 2024, which left over 50 dead, including security personnel, The attacks also specifically targeted Punjabi civilians. These centres are intended to hold individuals suspected of terrorism, insurgency, or militancy, enabling law enforcement and military agencies to detain suspects for up to three months without formal charges or court orders. This approach mirrors measures under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) adopted in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa following the 2014 Army Public School attack.
These shifts in policy indicate a more aggressive stance toward Balochistan, but their impact may be limited by broader geopolitical factors. Iran’s support for terrorism in Balochistan and China’s reluctance to acknowledge these issues publicly, while calling for mediation, add complexity. Addressing Baloch separatist terrorism effectively may require Pakistan to adopt a tougher stance on Iran, even if this risks upsetting China and escalating tensions with Tehran. Such moves could disrupt Chinese interests in Iran, mirroring how Iran’s actions have affected Pakistan’s security.
Politics and the Pashtun-Baloch Dynamics
Pakistan continues to face significant challenges related to ethnic disenfranchisement in both Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, a situation that figures like former Prime Minister Imran Khan have leveraged for political gain. Khan has used Pashtun grievances to stoke anti-state and anti-military sentiment, opposing counterterrorism operations and aligning with the Afghan Taliban and the TTP. PTI’s strategy has increasingly linked Pashtun and Baloch discontent, framing the Pakistani state as an oppressor and pushing an anti-state narrative.
In October, these dynamics were highlighted by a devastating attack in Duki, likely carried out by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), which killed at least 20 coal mine workers, many of whom were Pashtuns. This triggered protests at Bacha Khan Chowk, with demonstrators condemning the violence. The attack followed a string of similar incidents, including the October attack in Karachi targeting Chinese nationals and assaults on Punjabi workers, all tied to Baloch separatist groups. Pro-BLA accounts initially implied that the Duki attack targeted coal workers tied to pro-state “death squads,” consisting of Pashtuns and state-loyal Baloch, but hastily retracted these claims to avoid backlash against the terror group for the killing of Pashtuns.
Historically, and in today’s Pakistan, Pashtuns and Baloch have clashed over land and resources in Balochistan.
Mahrang Baloch acknowledged the killing of 20 Pashtun miners as a stark example of the growing lawlessness in Balochistan.
Caretaker Minister for Information in Balochistan Jan Achakzai, a Pashtun from Balochistan, highlighted how ethnic slurs by the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) and targeted killings by the BLA have sparked resentment among the Punjabi community. This has led to a rise in tensions, including a targeted backlash against Pashtun-owned businesses and vendors in areas like Multan, in Pakistan’s Punjab province. Achakzai’s perspective suggests that extremist elements are exploiting existing ethnic fault lines to create division and ethnic strife.
The Duki attack also exacerbates the already tense security environment. The TTP is taking advantage of this turmoil to push a unified Baloch-Pashtun ultranationalist narrative against the state. Recently, the TTP has issued warnings to Pakistani security officials, demanding resignations under threat of violence and urging their families to pressure them to leave their roles. This narrative frames Pakistan as the shared enemy of the Baloch and Pashtuns.
This reflects a broader pattern where groups with local rivalries, such as the Afghan Taliban backing the TTP and Iran supporting the BLA, find common ground when it comes to strategic goals. Despite the challenges between Iran and Afghanistan themselves, the BLA and TTP collaborate, and both Iran and Afghanistan align strategically against Pakistan when it suits their interests.
What Might Happen Next?
Iran and Pakistan have reiterated their commitment to tackle terrorism together, with Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi and Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar emphasising coordinated military, security, and political efforts. Both ministers highlighted terrorism as a shared threat that often stems from external factors, framing it as a pressing issue both regionally and globally. Araghchi’s two-day visit to Pakistan underscores this focus on joint action.
However, this collaboration may not deliver the outcomes Pakistan is aiming for. Despite renewed efforts, Pakistan remains largely on the periphery of major regional initiatives and China’s core interests, limiting the strategic impact these joint efforts may realistically offer. It is expected that Iranian-linked activities inside Pakistan will persist.
The uncertainty surrounding the Panjgur strikes on 5th November—whether by Pakistan, Iran or as a joint operation—further reflects deeper complications in Pakistan-Iran relations. If the strikes were Iranian, they reaffirm Tehran’s willingness to act within Pakistan’s borders, prioritising its security needs. A joint strike, however, might indicate Iran is strategically leveraging Pakistan’s resources to serve its own interests, particularly at a time when it faces increased vulnerability to Israeli actions.
For Pakistan, a continued reactive stance risks keeping them bogged down in forever militancy. To counter this, Islamabad may assert its autonomy by intensifying control over Balochistan’s security or expanding its cross-border operations as necessary. This recalibration would enable Pakistan to prioritise its security interests independently, avoiding repeated entanglement in Iranian agendas. The path Pakistan chooses now could reshape its regional influence significantly. For instance, if the recent strikes were indeed Iranian, would Pakistan respond as it did in January, with decisive retaliatory action?
Currently, there is little indication that Pakistan will undertake large-scale operations across Balochistan. Instead, the focus remains on targeted efforts against separatist groups like the BLA and their supporters. While narrower in scope, these operations reinforce Pakistan’s commitment to managing insurgent threats that compromise both its domestic security and key international investments. Security concerns in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa also remain a higher priority. Still, broader operations in Balochistan may become more likely if strategic needs arise—perhaps when domestic political stability permits or if such actions are deemed necessary to reinforce that stability. Things could theoretically change quickly.
We expect China to intensify its pressure on Pakistan’s national security establishment to ensure better protection for Chinese nationals and investments. However, Pakistan is likely to resist any Chinese deployments within its borders to bolster security against groups like the BLA. Such a move would be fraught with risks: Chinese personnel would be easy targets, identifiable by appearance alone, which would only fuel accusations of “colonisation” and likely amplify Baloch resistance. While a Chinese presence could deter Iran from escalating within Pakistan—serving as an indirect buffer against Iranian influence—Iran may still view this as an opportunity. Given its existing record of targeting Chinese interests in Pakistan, Iran could exploit the situation, potentially increasing attacks to strain Pakistan-China relations further and consolidate China’s strategic preference for cooperation with Iran.
The presence of Chinese security forces in Pakistan would also severely undermine Pakistan’s autonomy, restricting its ability to independently handle both internal security and broader strategic decisions. It would risk shifting Pakistan from an equal partner to a more dependent player in its own territory, eroding its flexibility in critical matters and creating potential friction within its own security and political circles. Chinese security deployments would not add numerical advantages or counterterrorism experience that Pakistan already has an abundance of.
With a newfound awareness, Pakistan may be in the process of recalibrating its alliances, drawing lessons from the strategic autonomy displayed by China and Iran. Recognising that China prioritises broader geopolitical interests over the immediate safety of its nationals, Pakistan could be on a path toward a similar approach. This shift would allow Pakistan to maintain the optics of “brotherly relations” with Iran and “iron brothers” with China—connections rooted in diplomatic tradition and economic ties—while ensuring these relationships genuinely serve Pakistan’s strategic goals. In practice, this means that actions taken by Pakistan to address Chinese concerns and secure foreign investments should ultimately be aligned with Pakistan’s own interests rather than solely accommodating Beijing.
Understanding this, Pakistan might realise that securing international arms and investment, including from China, is best achieved through assertive, self-serving policies rather than out of concern that China may retract its support. China’s sustained tolerance toward Iran, even amid provocations involving Chinese casualties, shows that China’s interests are strategically motivated. Pakistan could take necessary steps, including cross-border measures into Iran, regardless of alignment with Chinese preferences, signalling to Beijing that it is committed to securing its own interests. Much like Iran has done, Pakistan might operate in ways that protect its sovereignty without fearing significant consequences from China.
This does not mean Pakistan will “go against” China or become a threat to its long-term interests—nor would such a shift be sensible. Instead, it suggests that Pakistan may seek to recalibrate its approach to China and the region, aiming for a more balanced stance that aligns more with its own strategic objectives and newfound realities while maintaining strong ties. In the long run, this could actually strengthen Pakistan’s relationship with China, to the detriment of Iran.
After all, the Pakistani and Chinese air forces have just completed the “Indus Shield-Chinese” exercise, demonstrating advanced joint tactical capabilities with fighter jets, air defence, and electronic warfare systems to bolster operational readiness and interoperability. So, Pakistan would like to believe that it can strengthen its ties with China while still addressing matters that China might view less favourably. This approach suggests that Pakistan is aiming for a nuanced balance, one where it bolsters defence and economic cooperation with China, yet retains the freedom to pursue policies and actions in areas where Chinese interests may diverge from its own.
This approach to strategic autonomy echoes a broader lesson for Pakistan: that reciprocity should underpin its policies. China’s acceptance of Iran’s assertiveness, even at a cost, suggests that similarly bold moves from Pakistan are unlikely to provoke extreme reactions. Instead, China would likely avoid pressuring or punishing Pakistan too much, especially considering the risk of pushing it closer to the US. However, trust within Pakistan’s security establishment towards the US has waned—eroded by developments like those in Bangladesh and politics involving Imran Khan. This mistrust justifies Pakistan’s ongoing reliance on China, even while adopting a more self-directed stance.
Despite occasional improvements, India-China relations remain marred by strategic distrust, a reality that sustains China’s interest in a stable relationship with Pakistan. China values its partnership with Pakistan as a stabilising factor in the region, a dynamic that could embolden Pakistan to act assertively for its security, confident that China would temper its response to avoid destabilising the alliance.
After the January Iranian attack on Pakistani soil, Pakistan’s top general, Asim Munir, declared, “You cannot backstab us, and if you attempt to do so, you will face a suitable response.” This statement could indicate a real awareness shift, which fosters a more independent approach to addressing Iranian-sponsored terrorism. This could extend to proactively targeting entities linked to the Iranian state without waiting for provocation, possibly involving covert or overt operations against Baloch separatist groups operating from Iranian territory.
Such actions would mirror Iran’s stance when it targeted Jaish al-Adl while accusing Pakistan of harbouring the group. The January Iranian missile strike, which led to Pakistan’s swift retaliation against Baloch separatists—a move China had urged Pakistan to avoid—illustrated Pakistan’s capacity to disregard Chinese pressure when necessary.
Tehran, meanwhile, perceives the recent rise in Jaish al-Adl’s activity within its borders as a covert attempt by Pakistan to divert instability onto Iranian soil. Notably, Jaish al-Adl has focused on targeting Iranian state forces rather than Chinese interests in the area, underscoring a critical difference between Iran’s support of the BLA, which has directly disrupted Chinese projects, and Pakistan’s handling of these groups.
Ultimately, Pakistan’s continued targeted operations against separatists need to be matched by strategic action that leverages its military strength and diversifies its partnerships with nations like Azerbaijan, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. To achieve this, Pakistan must not only broaden, and in some cases, rekindle these relationships, but also assert its strategic autonomy as a core principle. This recalibrated approach—aligning military operations with national priorities and nurturing regional alliances—could reinforce Pakistan’s sovereignty, positioning it as a proactive and assertive player in the shifting geopolitical landscape. Without such measures, Pakistan risks falling behind as regional actors advance, potentially facing isolation and a diminished voice within an increasingly complex environment.
Impact of Donald Trump’s Election Victory
With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Pakistan security sources seem to think the United States is likely to adopt a more confrontational stance on Iran, aligning closely with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s own hawkish approach. Netanyahu’s recent decision to dismiss Defence Minister Yoav Gallant—who maintained more favourable relations with U.S. Democrats—signals a shift toward a more aggressive Israel-U.S. axis on Iran. This strategic alignment could pave the way for direct Israeli actions against Iranian targets, potentially supported by the United States, introducing a new level of complexity and volatility to regional dynamics.
Israeli Escalations: Targeting Iran’s Strategic Assets
With U.S. backing, Israel may feel emboldened to intensify its actions against critical Iranian sites, including ballistic missile facilities and sensitive nuclear infrastructure. Such operations, framed as countermeasures to Tehran’s military expansion, would likely impose significant resource demands on Iran, compelling it to extend its defences and focus on multiple fronts. While initially contained to Israeli-Iranian tensions, these escalations could reshape broader regional dynamics, compelling actors such as Pakistan to reassess their positions and strategies in this shifting landscape.
Pakistan’s Strategic Calculations Amid U.S.-Israeli Pressure on Iran
For Pakistan, increased U.S.-Israeli pressure on Iran presents a complex set of strategic considerations. General Asim Munir has previously cited Iran’s actions as “backstabbing”, and a distracted Iran could offer Pakistan an opportunity to address these concerns. In the event of an escalating Israel-Iran conflict, Pakistan might perceive an opening to target specific militant factions or camps within Iranian territory that threaten its security. Such an opportunity to address Iran-linked security threats may not arise again soon, and a weakened or fragmented Iran could enable Pakistan to neutralise longstanding challenges more effectively.
The Implications of Iran’s Nuclear Program and Potential Regime Change
In the event of intensified Israeli actions that could evolve into a broader conflict, the potential removal of Iran’s current regime and the dismantling of its nuclear programme would pose a multifaceted scenario for Pakistan. While the elimination of a nuclear-capable Iran would reduce a regional threat, the emergence of a U.S.-aligned government in Tehran could introduce new geopolitical complexities. Iran’s strategic location would continue to serve as a vital point of influence in the region, and a regime change led by U.S. interests could amplify American influence near Pakistan’s borders, potentially marginalising Pakistan’s own strategic ambitions.
Consequently, Pakistan may need to approach Iran as a potential long-term counterforce, regardless of the ruling regime. Should Iran retain its nuclear capabilities and continue activities that challenge Pakistan’s security, Islamabad may need to develop another recalibrated response.
There remains the distinct possibility that a nuclear deal may be pursued again, offering a controlled approach to temper Iran’s nuclear ambitions without the upheaval of regime change. Such a deal would reintegrate Iran into the global economy under stringent international oversight, recalibrating the region’s power balance. However, Israel could theoretically still push for escalation, either to provoke regime change or to prompt direct U.S. intervention, even if a deal is in place. Moreover, even with a deal, Tehran’s leadership may be destabilised if external pressures—particularly from Israel or the U.S.—intensify. This evolving uncertainty would require Pakistan to remain cautious, prepared for both cooperative and countervailing dynamics with a potentially volatile neighbour.
Long-Term Considerations for Pakistan’s Strategy Toward Iran
Regardless of who holds power in Tehran, Iran’s regional influence will likely require a carefully managed approach from Pakistan. An Iranian regime backed by a nuclear deterrent poses a serious strategic concern, while if governed by the current U.S.-aligned, or more neutral leadership, Iran would provide different concerns. Either way, Pakistan may need to consider Iran as a long-term competitor, especially if Tehran continues to engage in destabilising activities that impact Pakistan. This is true even if Pakistan’s relations with Iran improve after a potential regime change.
While these evolving dynamics may not align perfectly with Pakistan’s strategic needs, Islamabad could nonetheless leverage this shifting landscape to strengthen its position, maximising its interests without overtly challenging U.S., Israeli or even Chinese interests objectives.