Russia-Ukraine conflict: The uncertainty in the Middle East

Despite not being a direct threat to regional stability, the one-month ongoing Russian Ukraine conflict has the potential of secondary impact in the Middle Eastern area; consequential spillover effects that have exposed a certain degree of acting uncertainty among Middle Eastern countries in order to protect national interests, along with an attempted shift towards multipolarity.

Energy security, cooperation under the OPEC + umbrella to oil market stability maintenance due to increasing prices and consequent growing inflationary pressure, agricultural import dependence, military and security cooperation in regional conflict areas – such as Syria and Yemen –, the revival of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and Western-imposed sanctions affecting external investments are included in the primary concerns^[1]. Yet, an additional balancing trend emerges, revealing to be itself a point of juxtaposing hesitant sides taking. A balancing trend between a historical Middle Eastern security provider, seeming no longer willing to assist its partners and guarantee regional security due to its new Indo-Pacific pivot^[2] perceived by Middle Eastern countries as a region’s interest-changing or allies-abandonment, as the United States and the Russian Federation (to which the People’s Republic of China could be added)^[3], prominently re-affirmed energy, economic, diplomatic, and investments partner^[4].

The reluctance by Middle Eastern countries to back one side or the other, opting, on the contrary, for political estrangement and relatively neutral stance maintenance by cautiously favouring a diplomatic resolution and refraining from joining Western imposition of economic and financial sanctions against the Russian Federation is confirmation of such postulation. Further evidence is provided in that, despite the voting in favour^[5] of the majority of Middle Eastern countries on the 2^nd of March 2022 UN General Assembly Resolution^[6] on the Russian Federation’s immediate cessation of illegal use of force, none has by far imposed a sanctions package.

Russia’s returning presence

The uncertainty expressed and the maintenance of a low profile, avoiding direct involvement in the conflict, is symbolic of the importance of cooperative ties with the Russian Federation in achieving Middle Eastern countries’ interests. Indeed, the Russian Federation, after a period of low engagement in the aftermath of the 1990s Soviet Union’s dissolution^[7], prominently returned to its role as one of the – if not the – primary external operating actors in the Middle Eastern region in the mid-2010s. Such a return was also possible thanks to a series of concomitant occurrences or factors, which facilitated its re-integration: of significance is the key permissive heterogeneity of the new configuration of the international system pervaded by multiple power poles^[8], the gradual disengagement of previous regional security guarantors notably the United States^[9], and the consequent growing regionalism^[10].

Insofar as the system’s heterogeneity is concerned, reference is made to the undefined world order that surfaced after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of bipolarity in world affairs. An order characterised by a new power imbalance, in which the absence of Washington during the Bush administration (1989-1993) acting as a hegemonic superpower, reshaping the international order, encouraged the emergence of multiple and diverse regional security power^[11] poles. Such circumstance provided the Russian Federation with room for free maneuvering within the international system, adopting a flexible behaviour and cooperating with a diverse range of partners; even more when, in the aftermath of the Bush administration, the United States regained lost vigour, refocusing on international ambitions pursuit^[12].

The gradual United States’ disengagement from the Middle Eastern quadrant after 2003 Iraq and, more prominently, with the 2010 Obama administration (2008-2017), revealed to be an additional contributing factor to Russia’s return to the region. Indeed, notwithstanding the still reliance of several Middle Eastern countries on the United States’ security and defence partnership – specifically Gulf monarchies and Egypt – its relative power decline and gradual estrangement led to two primary consequences^[13]. On one side, power vacuums to be filled, proving to be particularly beneficial – especially after the outbreak of the 2010 Arab Spring, the ensuing appearance of Western hostility, and the 2015 intervention in the Syrian civil war – for the Russian Federation’s national concern issues address and national interests pursuit^[14]. Through a careful pragmatic and multilateral foreign policy aimed at regional status quo maintenance, national security guarantee, non-state actors’ opposition, forced regime change avoidance, national economic system consolidation and diversification, and multipolar transition promotion, the Russian Federation was, indeed, able to build imagery of a power broker, mediator, and security guarantor through the maintenance of a neutral stance in local Middle Eastern conflicts, and of pivotal commercial and investment partner, specifically in the energy – oil, gas, and nuclear – arms, and agricultural sectors^[15]. On the other side, the United States’ involvement dwindling and attention moving towards the Indo-Pacific area contributed to a shift in the regional power balance^[16]. New Middle Eastern powers, in fact, started to emerge – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (EAU), Qatar, Iran, Israel, and Turkey, citing a few – expanding their geopolitical influence in the area and diversifying their ties, establishing new relations with both regional and international actors, including the very Russian Federation^[17].

Conclusions

Concisely, Middle Eastern countries’ decision to adopt a neutral stance, not siding against the Russian Federation in order to avoid the aligning costs in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, is mainly guided by Russia’s partnership relevance for national interests’ protection. Energy policy cooperation, investments, trade-in diverse sectors, including agricultural commodities and military technology exchange, and geopolitical coordination reveal to be key intertwined interests with Russia’s agency and its diminishment due to conflict focus. A neutral position that, furthermore, demonstrates a preference for balance preserving and an attempted shift towards multipolarity. Neutrality, indeed, might be synonymous with repositioning seeking in the global context and adaptation to the multipolar tendencies of the international system, maintaining national interests always at the core.

1. International Crisis Group. 2022. “The Impact of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine in the Middle East and North Africa.” https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/impact-russias-invasion-ukraine-middle-east-and-north-africa; Macaron, Joe. 2022. “How does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine impact the Middle East?” Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/3/17/how-does-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-impact-the-middle-east ↑
2. The White House. 2021a. “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.” https://www.whitehouse. gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/03/03/interim -national-security-strategic-guidance/ ↑
3. Lons, Camille, Jonathan Fulton, Degang Sun and Naser Al-Tamimi. 2019. “China’s great game in the Middle East.” European Council of Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/china_great_game_middle_east/ ↑
4. Stepanova, Ekaterina. 2018. “Russia and Conflicts in the Middle East: Regionalisation and implications for the West.” The International Spectator. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2018.1507135; Stepanova, Ekaterina. 2020. “Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy in the Middle East: Entering the 2020s.” IAI. https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip2016.pd ↑
5. Dene, Margaret, Hannah Labow, Carol Silber. 2022. “Middle East Responses to the Ukraine Crisis” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pdf/view/17298/en; The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 2022. “The UN Resolution on Ukraine: How Did the Middle East Vote?” https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pdf/view/17313/en ↑
6. UN General Assembly. 2022. “General Assembly Overwhelmingly Adopts Resolution Demanding Russian Federation Immediately End Illegal Use of Force in Ukraine, Withdraw All Troops” https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/ga12407.doc.htm ↑
7. Morini, Mara. 2020. La Russia di Putin. Bologna: Il Mulino Upm. ↑
8. Parlar Dal, Emel and Emre Erşen. 2020. Russia in the Changing International System. Istanbul: Palgrave Macmillan. ↑
9. Stepanova, Ekaterina. 2018. “Russia and Conflicts in the Middle East: Regionalisation and implications for the West.” The International Spectator. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2018.1507135; Stepanova, Ekaterina. 2020. “Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy in the Middle East: Entering the 2020s.” IAI. https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip2016.pdf ↑
10. Wechsler, William F. 2019. “US Withdrawal from the Middle East: Perceptions and Reality.” In The MENA Region: a great power competition, edited by Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli. Milano: ISPI Ledizioni LediPublishing. ↑
11. Gaiser, Laris and Igor Kovač. 2012. “From Bipolarity to Bipolarity: International Relations Repeating Again.” Journal of Global Policy and Governance. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40320-012-0004-1; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette and Stephanie C. Hofmann. 2020. “Is the liberal international order in a state of terminal decline?” LSE. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/01/07/is-the-liberal-international-order-in-a-state-of-terminal-decline / ↑
12. Radin, Andrew and Clint Reach, C. 2017. “Russian Views of the International Order.” Rand Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1826.html; Omelicheva, Mariya Y. 2016. “Critical geopolitics on Russian foreign policy: Uncovering the imagery of Moscow’s international relations.” International Politics, 53: 708-26. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308578984_Critical_geopolitics_on_Russian_foreign_policy_Un covering_the_imagery_of_Moscow%27s_international_relations ↑
13. Wechsler, William F. 2019. “US Withdrawal from the Middle East: Perceptions and Reality.” In The MENA Region: a great power competition, edited by Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli. Milano: ISPI Ledizioni LediPublishing. ↑
14. Horn, Gerd-Rainer. 2017. “1968: A Social Movement Sui Generis.” In The History of Social Movements in Global Perspective, edited by Stefan Berger and Holger Nehring, 515-541 London: Palgrave Macmillan. doi: 10.1057/978-1-137-30427-8_18; Inbar, Efraim. 2016. “Implications of US Disengagement from the Middle East.” Middle East and Policy Studies 122. https://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/MSPS122.pdf ↑
15. Stepanova, Ekaterina. 2018. “Russia and Conflicts in the Middle East: Regionalisation and implications for the West.” The International Spectator. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2018.1507135; Stepanova, Ekaterina. 2020. “Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy in the Middle East: Entering the 2020s.” IAI. https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip2016.pdf ↑
16. Wechsler, William F. 2019. “US Withdrawal from the Middle East: Perceptions and Reality.” In The MENA Region: a great power competition, edited by Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli. Milano: ISPI Ledizioni LediPublishing. ↑
17. Del Sarto, A. Raffaella, Helle Malmvig and Eduard Soleir i Lecha. 2019. “Interregnum: The regional order in the Middle East and North Africa after 2011.” MENARA Final Reports. https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/project_papers/men ara_papers/final_report/interregnum_the_regional_order_in_the_middle_east_and_nor th_africa_after_2011 ↑